

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 01 OF 11 270814Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS JUNE 25, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 113

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION
WITH EASTERN REPS ON JUNE 25, 1974. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH
3 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

4. KHLESTOV AS HOST GREETED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT,
IN THE PRESENT SESSION, HE WOULD LIKE TO RESTATE ONCE
MORE THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AS KNOWN,
THE FOUR SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES HAD
SUBMITTED A DRAFT COVERING REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 01 OF 11 270814Z

AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THAT DRAFT

AGREEMENT, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD CLEARLY STATED AND SET FORTH ALL OF THE PROVISIONS NECESSARY FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY HAD CLEARLY INDICATED WHAT KIND OF TROOPS SHOULD BE REDUCED AND THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH WOULD BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 15 PERCENT. IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT AND IN SUBSEQUENT CLARIFICATIONS MADE THUS FAR, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT ALL ELEVEN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT ALSO CONTAINED A CLEAR TIMETABLE PROVIDING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS IN 1975-77.

5. KHlestov said eastern participants had made clear that this draft agreement and subsequent eastern proposals fully conformed to the principle of undiminished security on which the present negotiations were base. This draft agreement opened the possibility for a future discussion of reductions. Therefore, the draft agreement contained an equitable proposal for substantial reductions of armed forces and armaments in central europe of political importance and important as a contribution to military detente. Eastern reps had explained why they felt the western plan was inequitable and did not conform to the principle of undiminished security. West had indicated it was not prepared to accept eastern draft. While adhering to their own draft agreement for reductions and considering it equitable, the socialist direct participants had also stated their willingness to seek an initial step of reductions. It was only natural that such an initial step did not at all mean that ast had departed from the basic plan of the socialist countries, or that the latter was in any way impaired through the proposal of an initial reduction step. eastern reps had then decided together with western reps to seek such an initial step leading to reductions. In the last session, both sides had discussed their views on such an initial reduction step. Discussion in the last session indicated that all partici-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 01 OF 11 270814Z

pants believed the search for an initial reduction step useful and appropriate. the representatives of the socialist countries had explained that, while they were ready to seek an initial reduction step, such a step should conform to the agreed principle of undiminished security for all participants.

6. KHlestov continued that, therefore, proceeding from this

BASIC POSITION, THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP AND HAD SUBMITTED A NUMBER OF IDEAS AND PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVE. IT HAD BEEN POINTED OUT THAT AGREEMENT ON A FIRST REDUCTION STEP WOULD BE BASED ON THE IDEA THAT THIS FIRST STEP COULD BE TAKEN IN 1975. IT HAD ALSO BEEN POINTED OUT THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD EFFECT THEIR REDUCTIONS UNDER THIS FIRST STEP IN 1975 IN AGREED AMOUNTS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREED SCHEDULE. THUS, A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS HAD ALSO BEEN MADE WHICH MIGHT OPEN THE WAY FOR PROGRESS. THE PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO PROCEED TO REACH ACTUAL AGREEMENT ON AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THIS NATURALLY WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. EAST HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION MEASURES WOULD BE CONTINUED WITHOUT DELAY AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST STEP AGREEMENT AND MIGHT EVEN TAKE PLACE DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT AGREEMENT. DURING THE LAST SESSION, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD COMMENTED THAT A NUMBER OF THE EASTERN SUGGESTIONS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFULL. AT THE PRESENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON ALL ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION.

7. DRAWING ON TEXT APPROVED BY ADHOC GROUP, US REP SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD AN INTERESTING DISCUSSION IN THE JUNE 18 SESSION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. DURING THE COURSE OF THAT DISCUSSION, WEST NOTED A FEW POINTS IN THE PRESENT EASTERN POSITION. THESE WERE:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 01 OF 11 270814Z

A. THERE WOULD BE TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. THE FIRST STEP REDUCTIONS, TO BE AGREED IN THE FIRST NEGOTIATION, WOULD FOCUS MAINLY ON US AND SOVIET FORCES, ALTHOUGH OTHERS WOULD BE INCLUDED.

C. THE FIRST STEP MIGHT BEGIN WITH REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES.

D. THE FIRST STEP AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION COMMITTING PARTICIPANTS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SAME SUBJECT OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A SECOND NEGOTIATION. THESE POINTS MIGHT BE WORTH KEEPING IN MIND FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION.

8. US REP CONTIUED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT IN JUNE 18 SESSION THAT THE WEST HAD MOVED FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US SHOULD UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE I APPLYING TO THEIR OWN FORCES. WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT, IN DOING SO, AND IN EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE IMPORTANT OBLIGATIONS, THEY HAD MOVED TO THE MIDDLE GROUND ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 02 OF 11 270841Z

11
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

9. US REP POINTED OUT THAT AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV HAD DISPUTED THAT WEST HAD IN FACT MOVED TO THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSING POSITIONS. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV AND HIS COLLEAQUES HAD NOT CORRECTLY EVALUATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WESTERN MOVES. THEY REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT CHANGE FROM WESTERN ORIGINAL POSITION. ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY STATED THAT

THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AND THEY HAD NOW PROPOSED A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT BETWEEN THE TWO

PHASES.

10. US REP CONTINUED THAT, IN THE LAST SESSION, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV MADE A PROPOSAL OF HIS OWN WHICH HE SAID WAS AIMED AT MIDDLE GROUND. HE SUGGESTED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COMMIT THEMSELVES AT THE OUTSET OF A FIRST STEP TO

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 02 OF 11 270841Z

REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY A SPECIFIED AMOUNT AND AT A SPECIFIED TIME. HE ADDED THAT THE BEGINNING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY SOME OR PERHAPS ALL OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION COULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER THE BEGINNING OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. AT THE TIME, ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THIS SUGGESTION WAS SOME INDICATION OF A DESIRE TO BE FLEXIBLE, BUT HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SUGGESTION ITSELF WAS NOT A MOVE COMMENSURATE IN IMPORTANCE WITH THE ONES ALLIES HAD ALREADY TAKEN. IN FACT, AS FAR AS ALLIED REPS COULD SEE AFTER FURTHER STUDY, AMBASSADOR KHLESTOV'S SUGGESTION WAS A MINOR CLARIFICATION OF THE STANDARD EASTERN POSITION, ADVANCED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, IN A FIRST STEP OF REDUCTION. THE ONLY NEW DETAIL ALLIES HAD NOTED THUS FAR, AND IT WAS A SMALL ONE, WAS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME REDUCTIONS MIGHT START AT SOME POINT AFTER OTHERS HAD STARTED. APPARENTLY, ONLY A SHORT TIME DIFFERENCE WAS INVOLVED. BUT ALL WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE IN THE FIRST STEP AND THE SIZE AND TYPE OF THE REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE FIXED FROM THE VERY OUTSET. PRESUMABLY, ALL WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE SAME TIME. DESPITE WHAT ALLIES HAD HEARD FROM EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STEP, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE AND THIS ONE IS NOT EVIDENT. IF ALLIES WERE WRONG ON THIS POINT, THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE CORRECTED.

11. US REP SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE EASTERN SUGGESTION. ALTHOUGH THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES THUS FAR WERE SMALL, THE SUGGESTION DID APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS A RESPONSE TO THE ESSENTIAL QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AS GREAT POWERS AND THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES NOW APPEAR IN THIS WAY TO RECOGNIZE THAT, IN DECIDING TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES, WESTERN MEMBERS OF THIS SECOND GROUP WOULD BE TAKING A DECISION WHICH IS GREATER IN ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR SECURITY THAN THE SAME DECISION FOR THE

US AND SOVIET UNION. THIS RECOGNITION IS IMPORTANT. BUT IN
ALLIED VIEW, THE PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH EAST HAS DRAWN FROM
IT WERE INSUFFICIENT. THESE CONCLUSIONS DO NOT ADEQUATELY TAKE

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 02 OF 11 270841Z

INTO ACCOUNT THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION
OF THE GREAT POWERS AND THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
THEY WERE A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT A SMALL ONE AND
DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. IT WAS A CENTRAL FACT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS, THE US AND THE USSR, WERE IN A FUNDAMENTALLY
DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM ALL REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS Owing TO THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THEIR
MILITARY POWER. THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT HAVE
THESE RESOURCES. CONSEQUENTLY, THEIR POSITION WAS FUNDAMENTALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE GREAT POWERS. THEY SHOULD NOT BE
TREASTED IN THE SAME WAY.

12. US REP CONTINUED THAT, IN ALLIED VIEW, THE APPROPRIATE AND
ADEQUATE WAY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IS
TO AGREE THAT REDUCTIONS BY COUNTIES IN THE SECOND GROUP SHOULD
TAKE PLACE ONLY IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. THESE REDUCTIONS
COULD THEN TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE ASSURANCE GIVEN
BY PRIOR SUBSTANTIAL US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND BY PRIOR
ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONCEPT OF APPROXIMATE
PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AS THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS
WE HAVE PROPOSED. THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THESE WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DECIDE IN THE FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATION
TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THAT SAME STAGE IGNORED THESE
DIFFERENCES. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO DEFER REDUCTIONS TO A
SECOND PHASE DID TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THEM.

13. KHLESTOV SAID, IN VIEW OF REMARKS JUST MADE BY
US REP, HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS.
HE DREW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS FROM WHAT US REP
HAD SAID: US REP HAD REPEATED THE ALREADY
KNOWN ARGUMENTS OF WESTERN SIDE. FROM
WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID, IT EMERGED THAT THE WESTERN
REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED TO STICK TO THE ORIGINAL
WESTERN PLAN WHICH THEY CONTINUED TO BELIEVE WAS THE
ONLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS. ALLIED REPS
HAD PRESENTED THE IDEA THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT FOR THE US COULD NOT ASSUME OBLIGATIONS
TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS UNTIL A SECOND
STAGE OF NEGOTIATION OF WHICH IT WAS NOT EVEN KNOWN
WHEN IT WOULD BEGIN. US REP HAD JUST REPEATED ONCE
MORE THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 02 OF 11 270841Z

COULD NOT REDUCE UNTIL THEY RECEIVED ASSURANCE FROM PRIOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND UNTIL THE COMMON CEILING WAS AGREED. IN OTHER WORDS, US REP HAD REPEATED ALL CONDITIONS POSED BY ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE SINCE THE VERY OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAD ONCE AGAIN BEEN REPEATED THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT ASSUME A NO-INCREASE OBLIGATION IN THE FIRST PHASE AND THIS POINT HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS AN IMPORTANT MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND. ONCE AGAIN, ATTEMPTS HAD BEEN MADE TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND AND THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT THIS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE REQUIRED PRIOR REDUCTIONS OF US AND USSR FORCES.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 03 OF 11 270942Z

17

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

14. KHLESTOV SAID THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN HIS REPEATING THE CONVINCING EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT ALL

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THESE ARGUMENTS. ONE POINT WAS THAT THE NO-INCREASE OBLIGATION WAS NOT AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. HE WAS ALSO NOT GOING TO REPEAT ALL THESE ARGUMENTS HE HAD ADVANCED ON THIS TOPIC PREVIOUSLY. THIS LAST PRESENTATION HAD CONFIRMED WHAT HAD BEEN CLEAR BEFORE: THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE ATTEMPTING SOMEHOW TO EVADE THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE AND THE OBLIGATION TO FREEZE WERE NOT THE SAME KIND OF OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS INEQUITABLE THAT SOME SHOULD ASSUME THE FIRST KIND OF OBLIGATION AND OTHERS NOT. BUT THE NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL HAD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE REMAINING SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MERELY WISHED TO EVADE REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 03 OF 11 270942Z

15. KHLESTOV SAID US REP HAD DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US AND USSR HAD A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION FROM THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN OTHER WORDS, ALLIED REPS HAD REPEATED A CONCEPT PERSISTENTLY ADVOCATED OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS IN AN EFFORT TO CHANGE WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED, THAT THERE WERE FOREIGN FORCES AND INDIGENOUS FORCES IN THE AREA. THE WEST WAS TRYING TO INTRODUCE A NEW CATEGORY OF US-SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND AND ALL OTHERS ON THE OTHER, INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS TRUE THAT EACH REPRESENTATIVE WAS FREE TO DEFEND HIS VIEWS BY HIS OWN MEANS AND ARGUMENTS. BUT ALLIED REPS WERE PERFECTLY AWARE THAT THE EAST HAD ADVANCED CONVINCING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS EFFORT TO ESTABLISH NEW CATEGORIES BOTH IN THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS AND IN PLENARY MEETINGS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RECENT STATEMENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP. EAST REGARDED THOSE FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE JUST AS THE WEST HAD DONE IN THE PAST, AS CONSISTING OF FOREIGN AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. THEREFORE, WHEN WESTERN REPS NOW ALLEGED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THE NEW DISTINCTION BETWEEN US AND USSR ON THE ONE SIDE AND ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THIS WAS AN INSTANCE OF WISHFUL THINKING.

16. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THE REAL EASTERN POSITION WAS THE OPPOSITE ONE. EASTERN REPS HAD CLEARLY EXPLAINED THIS ON MANY OCCASIONS. THE EAST CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND ALSO FOREIGN AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. IT WAS ARTIFICIAL TO ADVANCE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. HE WAS NOT GOING TO DWELL ON OTHER ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY US REP IN PRESENT SESSION, SOME OF WHICH GAVE A UNILATERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EASTERN POSITION AND

EVEN DISTORTED IT. WHAT HE HAD IN MIND HERE WAS US REP'S ALLEGATION THAT THE EAST WAS FINALLY BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE FORCES OF THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND, AND THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER, AND THAT THIS RECOGNITION WAS BEGINNING TO CHANGE AND EFFECT THE EASTERN POSITION. IN THE FIRST PART OF US REP'S REMARKS, LATTER HAD SUMMED UP RESULTS OF THE LAST MEETING,

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 03 OF 11 270942Z

A SUMMING UP WITH WHICH ONE COULD NOT AGREE, TO THE EFFECT THAT NOW THERE WAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOW SEEK WAYS OF SEEKING REDUCTIONS STARTING WITH US AND USSR FORCES FROM THE START. FROM THE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF US REP, ONE COULD ASSUME THAT THREE POINTS HAD BEEN MADE IN LAST SESSION. BUT TO PREVENT ALLIED REPS FROM INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID BY EAST, HE WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS CLEAR.

17. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD STICK TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITION. UK REP HAD EMPHASIZED THAT AGREEMENT TO SUCH A FIRST STEP SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. SO IT HAD SEEMED AT

THE END OF THAT SESSION THAT AN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED THAT IT WAS APPROPRIATE TO SEEK A COMPROMISE FIRST REDUCTION STEP. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS ON THIS POINT. EAST HAD SHOWN A LARGE MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS TO TRY TO FIND WAYS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO REDUCTIONS. IN STUDYING THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD THOUGHT THEY MIGHT HELP PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND AGREEMENT ON AN INITIAL STEP. AND TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE ALLIED POSITION IN THE LATEST SESSION THAT THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP SEEMED TO SHOW THAT A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. BUT WHAT US REP HAD SIAD ON THE PRESENT OCCASION HAD COMPLETELY CHANGED THAT PICTURE. FIRST, US REP WAS STILL SPEAKING IN TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PLAN AS THE BASIS OF THE FIRST STEP, WHEREAS ON THE LAST OCCASION, ALLIED REPS HAD AGREED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOUL SEEK A FIRST STEP ON THE BASIS OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE STARTING POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. AT THAT TIME, ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER SEEKING A FIRST STEP ON THE BASIS NO LONGER OF THEIR OWN PLAN BUT OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 04 OF 11 270916Z

17

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

18. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, DESPITE THE CONTRARY REMARKS OF UK REP IN PREVIOUS SESSION, SUGGESTING THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD CHANGED THEIR BASIC POSITION, US REP ON PRESENT OCCASION HAD CLAIMED THAT EAST HAD IN FACT CHANGED ITS POSITION. US REP HAD ASSERTED THAT EAST HAD DRAWN THE CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT ONE SHOULD START WITH REDUCTION OF US AND USSR FORCES. BUT THIS STATEMENT WAS NOT CORRECT. EASTERN POSITION REMAINED THAT THEY SAW NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITION OF THE USSR AND THE US ON THE ONE SIDE AND THAT OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER. AFTER ALL, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT WITHIN EACH RESPECTIVE ALLIANCE THE US AND USSR HAD THEIR OWN DIFFERENT SHARE OF TOTAL FORCES. ANY REFERENCE TO THE IDEA THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM THE OTHERS DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE EASTERN POSITION. THE PICTURE WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED WHILE STICKING TO

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 04 OF 11 270916Z

THEIR BASIC POSITIONS TO SEEK A FIRST STEP. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT SHOW THE WAY, IDEAS ON A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THIS NEW EASTERN POSITION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN POSITIONS.

19. KHLESTOV SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THIS, WHAT US REP HAD JUST SAID SEEMED TO BE A STEP BACKWARD. HE MIGHT BE WRONG. ALLIED REPS HAD SIMPLY REITERATED ORIGINAL STARTING POSITION.

20. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP REFERRED TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EAST THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MERELY WISHED TO AVOID REDUCTIONS OR TO DEFER THEM TO A SECOND PHASE. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT EAST HAD EXPRESSED THE CONCERN THAT IF THESE REDUCTIONS ARE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE, THEY MAY NOT TAKE PLACE. ALLIES HAD POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS A POLITICAL FACT THAT, IF THERE IS A SUCCESSFUL FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THIS WOULD CREATE ALL THE CONDITIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT IN WHICH OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE. EVEN THOUGH THIS IS THE CASE, ALLIES HAD BEEN WILLING TO TRY TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS MORE SPECIFICALLY. THEY HAD OFFERED A NUMBER OF CLARIFICATIONS TO HELP MEET EASTERN CONCERN FOR ASSURANCE THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE. THESE CLARIFICATIONS HAD COVERED THE LINK BETWEEN THE PHASES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE TIMING OF THE SECOND PHASE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A REVIEW WHICH WOULD PROVIDE AN INDUCEMENT TO ALL PARTIES TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THE SECOND PHASE. ALLIES HAD INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING IN THE FIRST PHASE TO AN OVERALL TOTAL OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES IN BOTH PHASES. IN THIS WAY, ALLIES HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT TO NARROW THE RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO BE SETTLED IN A SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATION STILL MORE LIKELY. EAST HAS WANTED TO DECIDE THESE ISSUES IN A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. ALLIES HAVE WANTED TO DECIDE THEM IN A SECOND PHASE. HERE, TOO, ALLIES HAD MET EAST HALF-WAY. IF EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAW RE-

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 04 OF 11 270916Z

MAINING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN ALLIED POSITION, ALLIES WERE WILLING TO ADDRESS THEM. BUT ALLIES WERE UNWILLING FOR REASONS STATED TO CROSS THE LINE FROM REDUCTIONS BY OTHER WESTERN DIRECT

PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND PHASE, TO A DECISION IN A FIRST STEP TO REDUCE IN THAT SAME STEP. TO SUMMARIZE, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD FOUND THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL IN A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT AND RELUCTANCE TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS APPLYING TO THE FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

21. FRG REP CONCLUDED THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT YET AGREE THAT PARTICIPANTS HAVE YET FOUND THAT MIDDLE GROUND. IF THAT WAS THEIR BELIEF, THEN ALLIES BELIEVED IT WAS UP TO THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN BETTER DEFINITION OF MIDDLE GROUND ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIES WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER VARIANTS ON THIS ISSUE AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT CROSS THE LINE BETWEEN REDUCTIONS FOR REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND STEP AND REDUCTIONS BY THEM IN A FIRST STEP.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 05 OF 11 270936Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

22. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO SPEAK OF FIRST AND SECOND PHASES ALL THE TIME. BUT ON THE LAST OCCASION, PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MUTUAL SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL STEP OF REDUCTIONS. THOSE CONTINUAL REFERENCES TO A SECOND PHASE CONCEPT WHICH BELONGED TO THE ALLIED STARTING POSITION WERE INAPPROPRIATE IN SUCH A CONTEXT. IT HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE REFERENCE TO THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPS SHOULD NOT CONTINUALLY SPEAK OF SECOND PHASES. THE FIRST REDUCTION STEP SHOULD BE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. BUT, INSTEAD, ALLIED REPS KEPT REFERRING TO OBLIGATIONS IN A FIRST PHASE WHICH WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN A SECOND ONE. BUT EAST WAS NOW REFERRING BOTH TO OBLIGATIONS AND THEIR REALIZATION IN THE SAME FIRST STEP.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 05 OF 11 270936Z

23. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS WERE SPEAKING OF A FIRST STEP WITH FURTHER STEPS TO FOLLOW. ALLIED REPS WANTED THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF TWO SEPARATE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. BUT THE EASTERN OBJECTIVE IN THEIR FIRST STEP PROPOSAL WAS AN EFFORT TO REALIZE THE EASTERN POSITION, THE SAME EASTERN POSITION

WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE IN A FIRST STEP. THIS WAS NO WAY TO MIDDLE GROUND BECAUSE IT WAS, AFTER ALL, THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION. THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ONLY THE US AND SOVIETS SHOULD REDUCE IN A FIRST STAGE. SINCE THEN, THE EAST HAD INDICATED CERTAIN CONCERNS. IN RESPONSE, THE WEST HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH ITS CONCERNS AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS BY ASSUMING CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS. WESTERN CLARIFICATIONS WENT BEYOND THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT.

24. SMIRNOVSKY INSISTED THAT THE ALLIES WERE STILL SPEAKING OF ONLY TWO COUNTRIES REDUCING. THIS WAS THE SAME POSITION AS AT THE OUTSET. US REP SAID THIS WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. ORIGINALLY, ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED THAT SOVIETS AND US REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE BUT THAT REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE APPLYING TO THEIR FORCES. ALLIES HAD CHANGED THEIR VIEW AND ADDED TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. THESE PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW WILLING TO UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS. THESE OBLIGATIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SHORT OF THE REDUCTIONS BECAUSE TO ASK REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST STEP FROM THIS GROUP OF ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

WOULD MEAN TO ASK THEM TO COME THE WHOLE WAY TO THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION. THE EASTERN POSITION ON THE OTHER HAND HAD REMAINED THE SAME AS IT HAD BEEN FROM THE OUTSET. THE WEST HAD MOVED AND HAD ADDED NEW ELEMENTS TO ITS POSITION. THE EAST SHOULD MODIFY ITS POSITION IN AN EQUIVALENT WAY. ALL THE EAST HAD DONE THUS FAR WAS TO SUGGEST THAT SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD UZMBR IMPLEMENTATION ONLY A SHORT TIME. HOWEVER, IF EAST HAD SAID MORE OR HAD MEANT TO SAY MORE, THE ALLIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THIS.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 05 OF 11 270936Z

25. CANADIAN REP ASKED CZECHOSLOVAK REP IF ALLIES WERE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT THE EASTERN SUGGESTION WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS. APPARENTLY, EAST HAD AT LEAST AGREED ON TWO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS.

26. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID EAST WAS SPEAKING OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT AS A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION. AT THE SAME TIME, ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY OUTSET. HOWEVER, ALLIED REPS WOULD HAVE NOTED THAT, AT THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD STRETCHED THE MEANING OF THE WORD "OUTSET" TO MEAN "ONE YEAR". ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE BUT THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE ONLY IN THE SECOND PHASE. WHEN WOULD THAT BE? TWO, THREE OR FIVE YEARS?

27 SMIRNOVSKY SAID IT WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE REMAINING ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE DELIBERATELY AVOIDING AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. ALLIES HAD MENTIONED A POSSIBILITY OF A NO-INCREASE CLAUSE AFTER US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE. BUT THEY WERE NOT SAYING THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. EAST STILL DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD REDUCE AND HOW MUCH. ALLIES WERE AVOIDING A CLEAR COMMITMENT ON REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. HOW COULD ONE REACH ANY OTHER CONCLUSION? THE INITIAL ALLIED POSITION WAS THAT THE FORCES OF ONLY TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REDUCED AT THE BEGINNING. THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION WAS IDENTICAL.

28. FRG REP SAID ORIGINAL ALLIED POSITION WAS THAT ONLY TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST STEP AND THAT THE OTHERS SHOULD UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN THAT PHASE WITH REGARD TO THEIR FORCES. ALLIES HAD MOVED TO A DIFFERENT POSITION WHERE THEY WERE READY TO INVOLVE

THE FORCES OF OTHERS IN A FIRST PHASE THROUGH A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. THE ALLIES HAD ALSO EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES AND ALSO A REVIEW CLAUSE IN ORDER TO MEET EASTERN CONCERN

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 05 OF 11 270936Z

THAT A FIRST PHASE WOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS OF FORCES OF REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIES HAD TRIED IN THIS WAY TO MOVE TO THE MIDDLE GROUND. EASTERN POSITION REMAINED THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE IN A FIRST STEP EVEN THOUGH IMPLEMENTATION MIGHT BE A LITTLE STAGGERED.

29. SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALLIES WERE STICKING TO THE POSITION THAT ONLY TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. MOREOVER, ALLIED REPS WERE CONTINUING TO USE THEIR FAMOUS "IFS" AND CONDITIONS, SUCH AS "IF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE TOOK PLACE" AND SO ON. SO MANY "IF'S" WERE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE DESIRE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO AVOID REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 06 OF 11 271000Z

12

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON
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S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

30. FRG REP SAID THIS WAS NOT THE POINT. THE "IF'S"
WHICH SMIRNOVSKY HAD JUST REFERRED TO REFERRED TO IMPORTANT
PINTS OF THE ALLIED PROGRAM WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED
LATER WHEN PARTICIPANTS CAME TO DISCUSSING THE CONTENT OF
REDUCTIONS BUT WHICH WERE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR
DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD
BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

31. US REP SAID THAT WITH RESPECT TO ALLIED INSISTANCE
THAT REDUCTIONS BY OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TAKE PLACE
ONLY AFTER US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT
IF US AND SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I,
THEY WOULD IN FACT BOTH CARRY OUT THESE OBLIGATIONS.

32. CZECKOSLOVAK REP SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE STILL
ADDRESSING DIFFERENT TOPICS. EASTERN REPS THOUGHT
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 06 OF 11 271000Z

IT NECESSARY TO FIND SOME INITIAL STEP COMPROMISE
BUT NOW ALLIED REPS WERE INSISTING THAT THERE BE ONLY
TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE
MIGHT EASILY BE MORE. BUT ON BASIS OF THEIR ORIGINAL PLAN,
ALLIED REPS WANTED ONLY TWO PHASES AND NOTHING ELSE. FRG
AND US REPS SAID IT APPEARED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE IN
AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST TWO STEPS OF
NEGOTIATION. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID NEVERTHELESS ALLIES
KEPT ADVANCING THE SAME POSITION.

33. US REP SAID HE WANTED TO GO BACK TO THE QUESTION
RAISED BY AMBASSADOR SMIRNOVSKY. THE ALLIES WERE TRYING
TO NARROW THE RANGE OF ISSUES TO BE SETTLED IN A SECOND
PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING
WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED VIEW WAS THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD
REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE AND THAT ONLY THEN SHOULD ONE
ANSWER THE FREQUENT QUESTIONS OF
WHO WOULD REDUCE, HOW MUCH, AND WHEN. THE EASTERN
VIEW WAS THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD ALL BE RESOLVED
IN THE FIRST PHASE. HOWEVER, IF PARTICIPANTS COULD FIND
SOME MIDDLE GROUND, PART OF IT MIGHT CONSIST IN DIVIDING UP
THESE ISSUES AND TAKING SOME ASPECTS IN THE FIRST PHASE
AND LEAVING SOME TO THE SECOND. THE ALLIES HAD AFTER ALL
INDICATED THE OVERALL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS. THEY HAD

GIVEN THEIR ESTIMATES OF OVERALL STRENGTH ON BOTH SIDES AND A SUGGESTED COMMON CEILING FIGURE. IF THE LATTER WERE SUBTRACTED FROM THE FIRST, THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES WOULD BECOME CLEAR. ALLIES HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE THE MAJORITY OF REDUCTIONS REMAINING FOR THE WEST AFTER THE FIRST PHASE, SO THAT THE EAST MUST HAVE A GOOD IDEA OF HOW MUCH. AS TO THE QUEN QUESTION, ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A LIMITED DURATION NO-INCREASE PROVISION WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A GENERAL TIME FRAME FOR THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO AN INCENTIVE TO MEET THAT TIMEFRAME. AS NOTED, ALLIES HAD SAID THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS TRUE THAT THEY HAD NOT SAID THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE WOULD REDUCE. NONETHELESS, THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 06 OF 11 271000Z

MOVES. IF THE EAST COULD MAKE EQUIVALENT ONES, THIS WOULD DEFINITELY BE HELPFUL.

34. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT, THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL WERE CLEARLY INDICATED. US REP SAID THAT WAS THE EASTERN POSITION. ALLIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO THAT FAR. THEY HAD STATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS AS REGARDED THE FORCES OF REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT NOW THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, ALLIED REPS TOLD EAST THEY SHOULD SEEK MIDDLE GROUND. BUT AFTER SEVEN MONTHS, EAST STILL DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO DO. US REP SAID THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. AS HE HAD JUST INDICATED THROUGH REFERRING TO ALLIED SUGGESTIONS, THEY HAD INDICATED THE DIMENSIONS OF REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS HAD BEEN IN PURELY GENERAL TERMS. EAST DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD REDUCE AND BY HOW MUCH. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KNOW THIS. THE ALLIES HAD SUGGESTED A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND ALSO THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT IF A PARTICIPANT WERE NOT SATISFIED, THE WHOLE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SCRAPPED. THIS WAS TOO DRASTIC. IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE CLARITY FROM THE OUTSET.

35. THE US REP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS BUT WHAT SMIRNOVSKY HAD JUST SAID REPRESENTED THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION. THE EAST SHOULD MOVE FROM THIS POSITION. IT WAS TIME FOR THE EAST TO MOVE A MORE EQUIVALENT TO THAT MADE BY THE WEST. SMIRNOVSKY SAID IT WOULD BE MIDDLE GROUND IF FRG, UK, CANADA AND SAY, BELGIUM WOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE.

BUT IT WAS NOT MIDDLE GROUND TO SAY THAT ONLY TWO WOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE. US REP SAID THIS WAS ONE WAY TO APPROACH THE QUESTION BUT ANOTHER WAY WAS TO SAY WHAT OBLIGATIONS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST PHASE. ONE COULD THEN WORK OUT WHAT KIND OF OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR ALLIES TO ASSUME ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS, BUT NOT IF THEY CROSSED THE LINE TO REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE. THIS WAS THE WAY TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 06 OF 11 271000Z

36. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD SEPARATED THE FIRST STEP OF THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FROM THE REMAINDER OF THAT PROPOSAL. THEY HAD ALSO IMPLIED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS WITHIN THAT FIRST STEP MIGHT BE STAGGERED, ALSO INDICATING THAT PERHAPS REDUCTIONS BY A FEW MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT ALL OF THIS AMOUNT TO VERY LITTLE DIFFERENCE FROM THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION. THE EAST HAD NOT REALLY MOVED TO MIDDLE GROUND IN THIS MATTER.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 07 OF 11 271007Z

17
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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AMEMBASSY BONN
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S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

37. THE POLISH REP SAID HE HAD BEEN A LITTLE TAKEN
ABACK BY THE ALLIED REMARKS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. IT
HAD APPEARED IN THE LAST SESSION THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD
ALMOST REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO
FIND SOME MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON A FIRST STEP WHILE MAINTAINING
THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITONS OF EACH SIDE. THIS HAD BEEN
THE IDEA OF THE SOCIALIST REPS. THEY BELIEVED PARTICI-
PANTS SHOULD TRY TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM WHAT THEY
HAD BEEN PREACHING THUS FAR AND TRY TO FIND SOME
SEPARATE ELEMENTS AND MAKE THEM INTO A FIRST STEP
AGREEMENT. BUT ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, EASTERN REPS
HAD BEEN CONFRONTED WITH AN EFFORT TO PUSH THE DISCUSSION
BACK INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. FRG
REP HAD SPOKEN OF A LINE THE WESTERN REPS WERE NOT WILLING
TO CROSS. THIS AGAIN WAS A PRECONDITION. EASTERN REPS HAD
BEEN HOPING FOR SOME EXCHANGE AND QUESTIONS ON THEIR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 07 OF 11 271007Z

PROPOSAL IN THE PRESENT SESSION IN THE HOPE THAT ONE COULD
THEREBY SEE THE SHAPE OF A FIRST STEP SOMEWHAT BETTER.
BUT ALLIED REPS WERE NOW BACK TO BASIC POSITONS. THERE WAS
BASICALLY NOTHING DIFFERENT IN ALLIED VIEWS. ALL HAD
AGREED TO SEEK MIDDLE GROUND BUT FOR ALLIED REPS TO STATE
THEY HAD PRESENTED PROPOSALS WHICH ARE ON THE MIDDLE GROUND
IS INCORRECT. ALLIED REPS CLAIMED THAT, EARLIER, ALLIES
HAD DESIRED TO CONCENTRATE ON US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS
AND NOT TO SPEAK OF THE REST AT ALL AND THAT THEY HAD THEN CHANGED
THEIR POSITION. BUT HOW WOULD THIS HAVE BEEN A PRACTICAL
POSITION IN ANY CASE. ONE COULD NOT HAVE EVEN A FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT CONFINED SOLELY TO US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS WITHOUT
TAKING ANY ACCOUNT OF THE REMAINING FORCES IN THE AREA.
ALLIED REPS WERE NOW SAYING THAT THE MIDDLE GROUND WAS
REDUCTIONS BY TWO PLUS NON-INCREASE BY THE REST. BUT
THESE OBLIGATIONS WERE NEITHER EQUAL OBLIGATIONS NOR
THE SAME AS REGARD TO CONTENT. ALL THE ALLIED REPS
WERE WILLING TO SAY ABOUT THE REMAINING DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS WAS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER
ON POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS BY THEM. ALLIED REPS WERE CLAIMING
THAT THE EASTERN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. BUT FOR THEIR
PART, EASTERN REPS WERE NOW FACED BY THE ORIGINAL ALLIED

POSITION. BEYOND THAT, ALLIED REPS WERE NOW SPEAKING OF A LINE WHICH COULD NOT BE CROSSED. THIS OF ITSELF INDICATED THAT THE ALLIED POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED.

38. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED FLEXIBILITY. THEY HAD ASKED ALLIES HOW THEY MIGHT ENVISAGE CONTENT OF THE FIRST STEP AND HOW IT WOULD TAKE PLACE. BUT INSTEAD OF THIS RESPONSE, EASTERN REPS WERE NOW FACED WITH AN ALLIED WITHDRAWAL BACK TO REPETITION OF THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PLAN. HE BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE IDEA OF A FIRST STEP OF INITIAL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT TRYING UNNECESSARILY TO DRAW ON THE BASIC PLANS OF EACH SIDE FOR THE ELEMENTS OF THAT FIRST STEP. BECAUSE IF WEST INSISTED ON ITS ORIGINAL PLAN, THE EAST HAD AS MANY GOOD REASONS AS WEST TO INSIST ON ITS OWN PLAN.

39. POLISH REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FURTHER POINT. EASTERN REPS REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF LOOKING FOR A SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 07 OF 11 271007Z

FIRST STEP NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, BUT WITH RESPECT TO FINDING ANSWERS TO THE OTHER TWO QUESTIONS, WHAT KIND OF FORCES AND THEIR AGREED SIZE. IF PARTICIPANTS COULD CONTINUE ON THIS LATTER ROAD, HE BELIEVED THEY COULD ACHIEVE SOMETHING. BUT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO IF THEY PERSISTED IN GOING BACK TO ORIGINAL POSITIONS.

40. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD PERHAPS NOT FULLY APPRECIATED EASTERN POSITION. EAST REPS HAD SAID IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER THEIR APPROACH TO DEFER IMPLEMENTATION BY MOST OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE UNDER THIS SCHEME TO DEFER REDUCTIONS BY THESE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNTIL AFTER THE US AND THE USSR HAD COMPLETED THEIR REDUCTIONS?

41. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN ORDER TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION PARTICIPANTS WOULD FIRST HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT. THE DISCUSSION WHICH PARTICIPANTS HAD HAD THUS FAR IN THE PRESENT SESSION INDICATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FIRST TO DECIDE ON THE SUBJECT MATTER. AFTER ALL, ALLIED REPS HAD RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION. US REP SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES JUST MENTIONED BY POLISH REP. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO FINDING AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS IN THIS CONTEXT AND IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THEM.

42. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS IN FACT THE AGREED QUESTION, BUT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THAT QUESTION IN TWO DIFFERENT CONTEXTS. THE FIRST CONTEXT WOULD BE USING THE WESTERN PLAN AS A WHOLE AND THE EASTERN PLAN AS A WHOLE. THIS WOULD BE ONE BACKGROUND. THE WEST COULD PRESS ITS WHOLE PLAN AND THE EAST ITS PLAN. THIS WOULD BE ONE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES. ANOTHER SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE IF PARTICIPANTS WERE LOOKING FOR A FIRST STEP. THIS WOULD BE A SECOND SITUATION. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, ALLIES HAD ONCE AGAIN PRESENTED THEIR BASIC POSITION. US REP WAS CORRECT IN SAYING THAT ALLIED HD CHANGED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 07 OF 11 271007Z

THEIR OWN ORIGINAL PLAN TO ADD FURTHER OBLIGATIONS. THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE WESTERN PLAN WAS DIFFERENT NOW THAN IT HAD BEEN THREE MONTHS AGO. ONE MIGHT TAKE THE APPROACH OF CRITIZING WHAT HAD BEEN CHANGED IN THE ALLIED PLAN. BUT IT WAS TRUE THAT SOME CHANGES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED. IF PARTICIPANTS HAD TAKEN THE WESTERN PLAN AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, ONE MIGHT NOW DISCUSS WHAT FURTHER ELEMENTS MIGHT BE CHANGED. BUT THREE MEETINGS PREVIOUSLY, WHEN BELGIAN REP HAD PARTICIPATED, EASTERN REPS HAD CLEARLY INDICATED THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT WESTERN PLAN AS BASIS FOR CONSIDERATION AND WESTERN REPS HAD INDICATED THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THE EASTERN PLAN. THEREFORE, IN THE LAST SESSION OR SO SOVIET REP HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT ALLIED REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION ON AN INITIAL STEP, CONTAINING SOMETHING WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED FOR IN EITHER PLAN.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 08 OF 11 271013Z

12

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

43. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THE LAST SESSION, UK REP HAD EMPHASIZED AND EAST HAD AGREED WITH UK REP THAT THIS SEARCH MIGHT BE PURSUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. AND SO AT THE INFORMAL MEETING ON JUNE 18, IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION, HE, KHLESTOV, HAD SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE APPARENTLY IN AGREEMENT TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE ORIGINAL PLAN OF EITHER SIDE. HE HAD ALSO SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF THAT STEP. HOWEVER, ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, ALLIES REPS WERE ONCE AGAIN SUGGESTING THEIR OWN BASIC PLAN WITH SOME POSSIBLE VARIANTS AS A BASIS FOR A FIRST STEP, SO THEY WERE RETREATING FROM THE POSITION THEY HAD TAKEN ON THE LAST OCCASION. AT THAT TIME, THERE HAD BEEN A COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP, A COMPROMISE PLAN DEPARTING FROM THE BASIC POSITION OF

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 08 OF 11 271013Z

EITHER SIDE. THAT WAS WHEN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEGUN TO THINK ALOUD OF A FIRST STEP AND TO TRY TO FIND SOME COMPROMISE.

44. KHLESTOV SAID CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD BEEN RIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN SAYING THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT KNOW NOW HOW MANY FURTHER ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATION WOULD BE NECESSARY. BUT ONE COULD NOT RESOLVE THAT NOW. THE IDEA NOW WAS TO FIND SOMETHING INITIAL TO AGREE ON. ON THE BASIS THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE LAST OCCASION, EASTERN REPS HAD MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS. HOWEVER, IF ALLIED REPS HAD NOW SAID THAT THEY HAD CHANGED THEIR BASIC PLAN AND WERE NOW WILLING TO COMMIT THE

REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES,
THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT. THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED.
BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PARTICIPANTS WERE TO LOOK FOR AN
INITIAL STEP, SOMETHING IN WHICH OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ASSUMED BY ALL
PARTICIPANTS, AND THE SAME TYPE OF OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ASSUMED
BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO PURSUE THIS.
IN THE LAST SESSION, PARTICIPANTS HAD IN FACT
AGREED TO SEEK SOME INITIAL STEP, SO THAT THE QUESTION
NOW AROSE OF WHETHER WESTERN REPS HAD CHANGED THEIR POINT
OF VIEW SINCE THAT LAST SESSION.

45. US REP SAID THAT, BY COMMON AGREEMENT, PARTICIPANTS HWERE
SEARCHING FOR MIDDLE GROUND ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IT HAD BEEN
AGREED THAT THE SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION WOULD BE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OVER-ALL POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.
ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THEY DID NOT SEE HOW WHAT
KHLESTOV HAD SAID ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION DID NOT DIFFER FROM THE
ORIGINAL EASTERN PLAN. IN FACT, IT WAS THAT PLAN WITH ONE MINOR
CHANGE, AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THEIR REDUCTIONS
AFTER OTHERS. AS STATED, ALLIES MIGHT NOT HAVE FULLY
UNDERSTOOD EASTERN POSITION. HE HAD THEREFORE ASKED A
QUESTION ABOUT IT. AS ALLIES UNDERSTODD IT,
KHLESTOV HAD INDICATED THAT, AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS UNDER THE EASTERN FIRST STEP
PROPOSAL, IMPLEMENTATION WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED BY 1975.
WAS THAT CORRECT, OR COULD IT BE EXTENDED BEYOND 1975?

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 08 OF 11 271013Z

46. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY ONE POINT.
FRG REP HAD ALSO SPOKEN OF A FIRST STEP WHICH WOULD TAKE
THE FORM OF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT, BUT IF PARTICIPANTS
WERE TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP, IT SHOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT
AGREEMENT AND ITS MODALITIES SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF
COMPROMISE. THEREFORE, MANY ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC POSITION
OF EACH SIDE WOULD NOT FORM PART OF SUCH A FIRST STEP
AGREEMENT, BUT THAT WAS ITS VIRTUE. AT THE LAST MEETING,
PARTICIPANTS HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING
AGREEMENT ON AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. IN THAT CONTEXT, THERE
MIGHT BE ONE SET OF OBLIGATIONS BUT IT WOULD NOT COVER ALL
ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. THERE WOULD BE A PROVISION
PROVIDING FOR FURTHER STEPS OF NEGOTIATION OF THOSE THINGS
NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THE FIRST STEP. HE HAD HAD THE
IMPRESSION IN THE LAST MEETING THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE ACTUALLY
DISCUSSING SUCH A FIRST STEP. ON THAT BASIS, EASTERN
REPS HAD BEEN WILLING TO CONSIDER CERTAIN QUESTIONS. THEY
HAD EXPECTED ALLIED COMMENTS ON THESE QUESTIONS IN THE
PRESENT SESSION. EAST HAD PROPOSED CERTAIN ELEMENTS THEY

CONSIDERED DESIRABLE, WHICH COULD BE FRUITFUL AND LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST STEP. ALLIED REPS MIGHT WISH TO REJECT THESE ELEMENTS AND TO SUGGEST OTHERS IN THEIR PLAN IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. BUT THIS BASIS OF DISCUSSION WAS NOW IN QUESTION SO IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE BASIS FOR THE QUESTIONS OF US REP WAS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 09 OF 11 271048Z

17

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 9 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

47. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO REPLY FIRST TO POLISH REP'S REMARKS ABOUT ALLIED UNWILLINGNESS TO CROSS THE LINE FROM THE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE TO REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS LINE DID NOT MEAN THAT ALLIES WERE UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE. THIS LINE WAS ALREADY DEEP ON THE TERRAIN OF THE EASTERN POSITION. THE EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST STEP. THE AGREED OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS TO FIND MIDDLE GROUND THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THAT WAS THE

SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION. US DEPREP REMINDED KHLESTOV THAT LATTER HAD HIMSELF CONFIRMED THIS UNDERSTANDING IN HIS JUNE 6 PLENARY STATEMENT.

48. KHLESTOV SAID THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 09 OF 11 271048Z

SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN THAT IN CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE, THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS AND THEIR TYPE MIGHT ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. BUT AS REGARDS THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GIVE AN ANSWER BASED ON THE ENTIRE PLAN OF EITHER SIDE OR A SECOND REPLY WHICH WOULD BE VALID ONLY FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IF THE QUESTION WERE DEVELOPED ON THE FIRST BASIS, THE EAST WOULD GIVE A REPLY FOR A LONGER PERIOD, THROUGH 1977. THIS PERIOD WOULD ALSO BE LONGER IN THE WESTERN APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THERE, ITS DURATION WOULD BE UNCERTAIN. IN THE SECOND CASE, IF PARTICIPANTS STATED TO ELABORATE A FIRST STEP, THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO FIND A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION VALID ONLY FOR A FIRST STEP OF LIMITED DURATION. US DEP REP POINTED OUT THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO SEEK A SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET IN GENERAL TERMS, AND NOT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ONE OR ANOTHER SPECIFIC SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES. TO INTRODUCE SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WAS TO POSE PRECONDITIONS FOR SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION.

49. KHLESTOV SAID ALL PARTICIPANTS RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO SEEK A COMPROMISE SOLUTION ON THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT WHAT ALLIED REPS WERE SUGGESTING NOW WAS NOT A SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION AS A WHOLE BUT ONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR OWN PLAN.

50. IN RESPONSE, US DEPREP CITED REMARKS BY UK REP IN JUNE 18 SESSION AS FOLLOWS: "VARIOUS FORMULAE AND TERMS HAD BEEN USED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS THUS FAR TO DESCRIBE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE FIRST. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS AN 'INITIAL REDUCTION STEP'; A 'FIRST INITIAL STEP'; A FIRST STAGE IN THE EASTERN PLAN; AND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST PHASE. ALL OF THESE TERMS, AS EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD, INVOLVED FINDING ANSWERS TO THE THREE QUESTIONS KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED ON THE LAST OCCASION AND WHICH UK REP HAD REFERRED TO IN HIS REMARKS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED BEFORE STARTING THIS SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 09 OF 11 271048Z

TRY AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME TO TACKLE THE ANSWERS TO ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS. RATHER, THEY HAD AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE ONE BY ONE THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN ANY FIRST PHASE, OR STEP OR WHATEVER IT WAS CALLED AND SHOULD DO SO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE REMAINING PROPOSALS OF EITHER SIDE. PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING THE FIRST OF THE THREE QUESTIONS KHlestov had mentioned, that of whose forces should be reduced from the outset. Allied Reps fully understood that when East proposed a possible answer to this question, it was doing so without prejudice to their principles."

51. US DEPREP SAID THESE REMARKS BY UK REP HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT ALLIES HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL QUESTION OF SIZE AND TYPE OF REDUCTIONS AT A LATER TIME, BUT HAD ALSO AGREED WITH THE EAST THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE ATTEMPT TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION FOR THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

52. KHlestov said this was indeed basic allied position. He believed that agreement had in addition been reached that each side could touch on relevant issues in discussing this question. So when UK rep had said participants should seek answer to one question at a time, his own reply had been that it would be more helpful in terms of solving first question if participants were free to touch on the remaining questions. These informal meetings should not be so rigorously conducted. They would lead to more results if participants could range wider in the subject matter. US DEPREP said KHlestov should not seek to impose as a condition for seeking a solution of the already agreed question of whose forces should be reduced from the outset prior allied agreement to seek some first reduction step however defined.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 10 OF 11 271027Z

12

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

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S E C R E T SECTION 10 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

53. KHESTOV SAID HE AGREED PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE WAS ATTACHING NO CONDITIONS TO THE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION. BUT THERE WERE TWO BASIC PLANS IN EXISTENCE. BOTH PLANS PROVIDED FOR COVERAGE OF A LONG PERIOD AND MORE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED ALLIED PLAN RAN COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BUT ALLIED REPS DISAGREED ON THIS POINT. SO IF THIS WERE THE ONLY CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD BE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES. THE WEST WOULD ADVANCE ITS PLAN AND PERHAPS SUGGEST SOME VARIANTS. THIS WOULD BE A POSSIBLE COURSE. BUT THE EAST HAD DECIDED TO SHOW ITS FLEXIBILITY. EASTERN REPS HAD CALLED ON THE WEST, HAD IN FACT APPEALED TO THE WEST, TO JOIN EAST IN A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COVER A SHORTER TIME AND WOULD NOT BE A FULL-FLEDGED AGREEMENT

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 10 OF 11 271027Z

COVERING ALL THE ASPECTS WHICH WERE COVERED BY THE BASIC PLANS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS SUGGESTION WAS NOT POSED AS A CONDITION FOR SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION. IT REFLECTED A DESIRE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD IN ORDER TO CREATE BETTER POLITICAL CONDITIONS. SUCH A FIRST STEP WOULD HAVE POSSIBLE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND POSSIBLY MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

54. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIED REPS HAD FOR A LONG TIME REJECTED THIS POSSIBILITY. THEN, FINALLY, AT THE LAST SESSION, THEY HAD INDICATED THEY WERE READY TO CONSIDER IT. THEREFORE, THE IDEA OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT WAS NOT A PRECONDITION, BUT ONLY A REFLECTION OF A COMMON DESIRE TO SEEK A NEW STEP. IT WAS SOMETHING GOOD. ALSO IT PROVIDED FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MENTIONED. IT WOULD BE GOOD AND HELPFUL TO SOLVE THOSE QUESTIONS. BUT A FIRST STEP WAS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION.

55. US REP SAID THOSE REMARKS INDICATED THAT KHLESTOV WAS IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH THE IDEA OF GIVING PRIORITY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WITHOUT PRE-JUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE SUMMARIZED THE QUESTIONS THAT HE HAD ASKED OR HAD WISHED TO ASK ON THE EASTERN APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT IT HAD BEEN PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. THESE QUESTIONS WERE: (A) KHLESTOV HAD SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEFER IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTION BY MOST WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO DEFER IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT THE US? (B) KHLESTOV HAD INDICATED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE TIMING OF IMPLEMENTATIONS IN THE FIRST STEP HE HAD PROPOSED. COULD THIS BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE YEAR 1975? (C) KHLESTOV HAD SAID THAT US AND SOVIETS COULD START IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS FIRST. COULD THEY COMPLETE THEIR IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF IMPLEMENTATION BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS? (D) WAS HE RIGHT IN CONCLUDING FROM EARLIER DISCUSSION DURING THE PRESENT OCCASION THAT, THEORETICALLY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEFER REDUCTION BY SOME DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS?

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 10 OF 11 271027Z

56. KHLESTOV SAID US REP HAD RAISED THE KIND OF QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT COME UP IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING SOME SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. WAS HE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT ALLIED REPS AGREED TO REDUCTIONS IN 1975? THE KIND OF QUESTION THE US REP JUST PUT WAS THE TYPE OF QUESTION THAT CAME UP WHEN SOMETHING WAS ACCEPTED AS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

57. US REP SAID HE WAS NOT MAKING THE POINT RAISED BY KHLESTOV, BUT A VERY SIMPLE POINT. IN THE LAST SESSION, KHLESTOV HAD HIMSELF MADE A SUGGESTION WHICH HE SAID WAS MIDDLE GROUND. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTED MIDDLE GROUND. HOWEVER, ALLIED REPS RECOG-

NIZED THEY MIGHT HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD EASTERN SUGGESTION.
HE HAD THEREFORE ASKED SOME QUESTIONS BOTH TO UNDERSTAND THE
PROPOSAL BETTER AND TO ASCERTAIN HOW FAR IT DIFFERED
FROM THE WESTERN POSITION. ON THE SURFACE, THE EASTERN
MOVE DID NOT APPEAR TO REPRESENT MUCH OF A MOVE FROM THE
ORIGINAL EASTERN PLAN AND NOT MUCH OF A MOVE TOWARDS
MIDDLE GROUND BUT THIS APPEARANCE COULD BE WRONG.

58. KHLESTOV SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO US REP'S THIRD
QUESTION, REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT US AND SOVIET
REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE COMPLETED BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF
REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BEGAN, ALLIED
REPS WERE AWARE OF WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID ON THIS
TOPIC IN THE LAST SESSION: IN THE CONTEXT OF REDUC-
TIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE COURSE OF 1975, EASTERN
REPS WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOME ALTERNATIVES. SO
THAT IF US REP'S THIRD QUESTION REFERRED TO THIS SUBJECT,
THIS WAS THE ANSWER. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER EASTERN
REPS WOULD BE RIGHT IN ASSUMING THAT THE IDEA THAT
REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY 1975 WAS ACCEPT-
ABLE TO THE WEST. HE ASKED THIS QUESTION BECAUSE IT
WAS IMPORTANT IN EVALUATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
QUESTIONS RAISED BY US REP.

59. US REP ASKED WHETHER THIS REPLY MEANT THAT, IF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS REDUCED THEIR FORCES IN 1975,
THEN THE US AND USSR COULD COMPLETE THEIR
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SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00114 10 OF 11 271027Z

REDUCTIONS FIRST AND OTHERS COULD FOLLOW. KHLESTOV
SAID THE ONLY ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS TO REPEAT THE FORMULA
WHICH HAD BEEN USED ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION (HERE KHLESTOV READ
THE FORMULA): "CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO AGREEING ON A
TIMETABLE FOR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD
APPEAR TO EAST THAT THE USSR AND THE USA, AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, MIGHT UNDER SUCH A SCHEDULE BEGIN
REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BEFORE
THE OTHERS DO SO, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT, BEFORE THE
END OF 1975, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IMPLEMENT
REDUCTIONS OF THE AGREED SCOPE." KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS
THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THE LAST OCCASION.
WOULD ALLIES NOW AGREE WITH IT?

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00114 11 OF 11 271108Z

12

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-10 IO-14

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SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

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S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 11 MBFR VIENNA 0114

FROM US REP MBFR

60. US REP SAID KHLESTOV'S REPLY TO HIS QUESTION DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER US AND SOVIETS COULD FINISH THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE OTHERS BEGAN, ASSUMING ALL WOULD COMPLETE THEIR REDUCTIONS BY 1975. KHLESTOV SAID EAST WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALL THESE IDEAS. EAST HAD IDEAS OF ITS OWN AND WEST HAD ITS IDEAS. EAST WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ALL THESE. WHAT EAST HAD SAID THUS FAR ON THE SUBJECT WERE ONLY INITIAL IDEAS. TO PURUSE THE SUBJECT FURTHER, THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO FIRST HEAR WESTERN IDEAS ON THE TOPIC. UP TO NOW, EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD ONLY VARIANTS ON THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PROPOSAL. BUT IF THE WEST WERE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT, THIS WOULD CREATE A DIFFERENT SITUATION.

61. CANADIAN REP SAID US REP HAD ASKED FOUR DISTINCT QUESTIONS. HE HIMSELF HAD ASKED SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00114 11 OF 11 271108Z

ON THESE SAME ISSUES IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION. HE ASSUMED FROM KHLESTOV'S GENERAL RESPONSE THAT THE ANSWER TO ALL OF

THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS BEING YES.

62. KHLESTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FIRST DECIDE THE BEST ISSUE OF HOW TO SEEK SOLUTION TO THE FIRST QUESTION (COMMENT RE, WHICH OF THE TWO CONTEXTS HE HAD MENTIONED). WESTERN QUESTIONS IN THIS CASE HAD BEEN PUT IN A WAY THAT MIGHT GIVE IDEA THAT WESTERN REPS WERE BASICALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IDEA OF A FIRST STEP REDUCTION AND WERE NOW TRYING TO FIND SPECIFIC INTERPRETATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTERN QUESTIONS MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO SEE WHETHER THE EAST WOULD MAKE FURTHER INTERPRETATIONS IN ORDER TO MEET THE WEST HALF WAY. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE HOPE OF SEEKING AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THE EAST AWAITED THE WESTERN REPLY TO THIS SUGGESTION, THE REPLY TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO SEEK AN INITIAL STEP. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT ALLIED REPS HAD SAID SO FAR, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH A STEP. IN THESE CONDITIONS, HE WAS NOT WILLING TO GIVE ANY MORE CLARIFICATIONS. SO NOW IT WAS UP TO THE ALLIES TO CHOOSE THE GROUND FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

63. FRG REP SAID IF KHLESTOV WISHED TO ESTABLISH A CONDITION THAT IF ANYONE WHO ASKED A QUESTION WAS INDICATING AGREEMENT TO A PROPOSAL EARLIER MADE, THEN THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD FREEZE ALL DIALOGUE.

64. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER PART OF THE RANGE OF ISSUES RAISED BY THE EAST IN CONNECTION WITH REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THEY MADE SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD NARROWING THOSE ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO COMMITMENTS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REGARDING THEIR FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED EASTERN SUGGESTION MADE IN PREVIOUS SESSION. IT INVOLVED ONLY A SMALL CHANGE IN DETAIL FROM THE EARLIER EASTERN PLAN: REDUCTION OF SOME DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD START AFTER REDUCTION OF OTHERS. THE EASTERN POSITION STILL REQUIRED AN AGREEMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD START AFTER REDUCTION OF OTHERS. THE EASTERN POSITION STILL REQUIRED AN AGREEMENT BY ALL DIRECT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00114 11 OF 11 271108Z

PARTICIPANTS OF FIRST STEP TO FIX TYPE AND SIZE OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF EAST COULD FIND SOME MODIFICATION TO THAT POSITION WHICH WOULD HELP MOVE THE EASTERN POSITION TO MIDDLE GROUND.

65. CZCHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT IN THE SAME WAY, EASTERN REPS HOPED ALLIED REPS WOULD HAVE SOME CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS ON EASTERN FIRST REDUCTION STEP IN NEXT SESSION. EAST HAD PROPOSED REDUCTION OF 20,000 PER SIDE. ALLIES SAID THIS WAS

NOT SUBSTANTIAL. EAST DID NOT KNOW WHAT ALLIES HAD IN MIND AS REGARDS CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE. IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HEAR ALLIED VIEW ON THIS TOPIC. ALLIED REPS STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE AGREED TOPIC OF DISCUSSION.

66. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON JULY 2. RESOR

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Message Attributes

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